“Large activist funds have stepped up the pressure on German companies, threatening the insulation that the two-tier board structure would normally provide.”

Michael Reinert, Senior Managing Director

Country:
Germany

Country: Germany

Average % of insider ownership:

4.56

Activism
Threat Level


To learn more about this country, please click on the tabs below


Shareholder activism in Germany has picked up significantly with 17 activist approaches ongoing through 2016. While this trend is likely to continue, German corporate boards are structured under the two-tier system which often insulates executives from activism. The recent success of several large campaigns, targeting the board structure and executive remuneration as well as opposing takeover terms, has provided a new level of confidence for European institutional investors and activists looking to make their next move.

Shareholders reaching, exceeding, or dropping below a 3% threshold must disclose their voting interests within four business days.

Disclosure of information on aims, origin of funds, and planned influence on the management of the company is required if the voting interests reach or exceed 10%.

When shareholders reach a 5% threshold, they receive the right to call for a general meeting and propose amendments to the general meeting agenda (e.g. resolutions to remove supervisory board members). Additionally, at 5% or more shareholders gain the right to block a squeeze-out of minority shareholders.

Once shareholders reach 10%, they receive significantly more control and may nominate members of the supervisory board in a privileged way and gain an individual vote on dismissal of management. At this threshold, shareholders may block a merger-related squeeze-out of minority shareholders.

Management is generally ring-fenced by the two-tier management board/supervisory board structure, hence members of the management board cannot be proposed by shareholders (they are appointed by the supervisory board).

Companies are not required to hold an annual vote on remuneration of the management board. Although the general meeting may resolve on the approval of the compensation scheme, this resolution does not give rise to any rights or obligations.

Further structural defenses include preference shares (non-voting shares), restricted transferability of registered shares, and staggered terms of members of the supervisory board.


Top Campaigns by Type

1. Lack of/Inaccurate information from Company
2. Remuneration
3. Board Independence

Campaigns By Year

Total
Campaigns

55

Notable Invested Activists

Elliott Management
The Children's Investment Fund Management
Active Ownership Capital

Recent activism campaigns

SLM Solutions Group
VS.
Elliott Management
Volkswagen
VS.
The Children's Investment Fund Management
E.ON
VS.
Knight Vinke Asset Management

Total Active
Campaigns

24

Contact FTI Consulting

Geoff Serednesky

Capital Markets Research and Activist Engagement
Managing Director
+1 312 861 4721
Geoff.Serednesky@FTIConsulting.com

Dr. Lutz Golsch

Senior Managing Director
+49 69 920 37 110
Lutz.Golsch@fticonsulting.com